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American Ballet Theatre

New York, NY

Michael M. Kaiser, 2005

 

In 1995 American Ballet Theatre’s accumulated deficit of $5 million put the organization in a major financial crisis.  By 1998 the organization was able to retire its deficit by focusing on creating new repertoire and educational programs, increasing its presence in New York City, and aggressively marketing its artistic product.

 

 

 

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In June 1995, I received a call from Peter Joseph, Chairman of American Ballet Theatre (ABT), asking if I would agree to become the new Executive Director of the company.  I had been doing consulting for the organization and had a clear idea of the huge problems it faced.  There were similarities to Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater Foundation: cash flow was a major problem and revenue had to be increased.  There were substantial differences as well: while fundraising could be improved, it was relatively strong.  But ticket sales were not adequate for the New York season and touring activity was extremely weak.

 

This was not surprising.  The collapse of dance touring had hit large ballet companies particularly hard.  While many presenters could afford modern dance companies, with limited personnel and taped music, it was harder to pay large ballet companies and orchestras.  When Ailey toured, we brought about 45 people on the road—ABT traveled with 125.  The local presenter also had to find and pay an orchestra.  It could be prohibitive.  Yet ABT was founded in 1940 as a touring company; it could not survive on only eight weeks at the Metropolitan Opera House each spring.

 

The contract with the ABT dancers required the company to pay for 36 weeks of work, of which one was a vacation week.  This meant that the company, in addition to eight weeks at the Met and twenty weeks of rehearsal, had to find seven other performing weeks each year.  This was proving very difficult.  The company was forced to cut deals that had it losing substantial sums on each tour week.

 

I felt, as I always do, that the central problem had to do with the nature of the art and the marketing of the product.  ABT had always been the company of stars.  The list of ABT principal dancers is a roster of the stars of ballet of the latter half of the twentieth century.  From Alonzo to Bruhn, Makarova to Baryshnikov, Gregory to Bujones, ABT was laden with celebrity dancers of the highest caliber.  When Mikhail Baryshnikov became artistic director in 1980, he had a different vision.  He wanted to improve the general level of dancing and aimed to build a corps of unparalleled excellence.  He wanted to establish an ensemble and move away from star-driven casting.  While he remained with the Company, this policy worked because he was a star of such great magnitude.  Donors and ticket buyers were anxious to see Baryshnikov’s company at work.

 

When he left, in a dispute with the Board in 1990, the company lost its greatest star.  While there were other dancers of renown and great ability, the company no longer had the long list of famous principal dancers that audiences were happy to pay to see and that donors wished to support.

 

As a result of the lack of “star power,” ticket sales and contributions fell and the loss of tour income further damaged the company.  By 1994, the organization was in dire need of cash.

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